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Abstract: 
The Dominican Republic’s microfinance sector is considered to be a solid market where 
overindebtedness prevention best practices are widely, and successfully, implemented. Relying 
on qualitative data collection tools and analysis, we identify these ‘best practices’ as self-
regulation mechanisms, and we show how they fail to fully fulfil their goals in the Dominican 
market. While financial exclusion supports the idea of a sizeable microcredit market, we argue 
that the focus on growth and high competition strongly jeopardize the positive social outcomes 
of microcredit, and that only a paradigm shift within the sector will change the present situation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The promotion of poor people’s financial inclusion has been one of the main pillars of 
development strategies around the world in the last 40 years. The communication of success of 
some organizations delivered the image of microfinance as the long awaited silver bullet able to 
end poverty: provide a credit to an unbanked person and she will escape from poverty by herself 
thanks to her own entrepreneurial spirit. At the same time, the institution that offers the credit 
must be profitable to ensure sustainability and to universalise financial inclusion (Soederberg, 
2013). 
This image of a win-win solution to poverty eradication, and a sizeable market, 1  led to a 
commercialization trend and attracted new players into the field (Ledgerwood and Gibson, 2013; 
Intellecap, 2009). The new microfinance actors carried with them a banking logic that gradually 
gained space in the sector, replacing poverty alleviation as the main source of legitimacy driving 
the support from public and private donors. This paradigm shift came together with financial 
metrics becoming the ‘universally’ accepted performance measures, conditioning in this way the 
priorities of the MFIs (Kent and Dacin, 2013). The conceptualisation of poverty as a lack of goods 
and services dominated the international scene, and the discussion of complex structural, 
correlated and systemic factors supporting inequalities and generating poverty traps was avoided 
or not considered. "Capitalist structures, processes and beliefs remain at the core of these 
development ‘solutions’" (Blowfield and Dowlan cited by Banks and Hulme 2014: 188). 
In practice, the steady growth of microcredit schemes (in terms of number of branches and 
clients), along with market concentration, brought about strong competition and market 
saturation, at least in urban and peri-urban areas, and for the upper segment of the poorest. As the 
sector grew, in many of these areas, what was a credit demand gap became a credit oversupply 
with competition (among other factors) having a strong impact on the way the programs were 
being implemented and their outcomes (Chen et al., 2010; Assefa et al., 2013; McIntosh and 
Widyck, 2005). 
                                                 
1 This significant unmet demand was for example portrayed in the 2009 report on the Indian microfinance market 
(Intellecap, 2009), and is reflected on the prediction made by ResponsAbility of a growth between 15% and 20% in 
2015 for the global microfinance market (ResponsAbility, 2014). 
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The delinquency crises faced by important microfinance markets, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Morocco, Nicaragua or Andhra Pradesh (Guérin et al., 2015; Rozas, 2013; Schicks, 2013), have 
drawn attention to the impact of microfinance on clients and, concurrently, the academic debate 
provided evidence supporting the lack of impact of the microcredit programs on poverty reduction 
(Banerjee et. al, 2015; Duvendack et al., 2011).2 Moreover, the research developed by J. Schicks 
in Ghana, focusing on repayment behavior from a client protection perspective, showed that 
clients may be over indebted and facing ‘unacceptable’ sacrifices, even if they manage not to 
default in their microfinance loans (Schicks, 2014; 2013). Overindebtedness has, thus, become a 
central issue in the sector, being identified as the top risk for the industry in the last two Banana 
Skin Reports (Lascelles and Mendelson, 2012; Lascelles et al., 2014).  
The reaction to the crises has generated a number of initiatives, both at local and international 
levels, mostly based on self-regulation mechanisms implemented at the level of the microfinance 
institutions. The most relevant initiatives at international level include the Smart Campaign, the 
Universal Standards for Social Performance Management and Microfinance Transparency 
(International Finance Corporation, 2013). 3 
At national level, the Indian case is emblematic and illustrates the challenges of self-regulation 
(Forster, 2012). In January 2010, the then recently formed Microfinance Indian Microfinance 
Network (MFIN) tried to establish a Code of Conduct for its members. Driven by what were 
considered “isolated incidents of over-lending in some pockets of the country” (Intellecap, 2009: 
7), the prevention of client overindebtedness was one of the issues included in the document. This 
initiative, however, did not enable to prevent the Andhra Pradesh crisis as competition, growth 
imperatives, and the lack of enforcement mechanisms constrained the implementation of the Code 
(Rozas, 2014). 
When crises are seen as a sequence of “unique events that dislocate, rearticulate, and transform 
the interpretation and meaning of cultural symbols and social and economic structures”,4 they 
may represent an opportunity for rupture and structural change (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008:116; 
Sewell, 1996). Notwithstanding, the response to the microfinance crisis, as for the major financial 
crisis, was not able to question the structure of the system itself, namely a competitive market 
aimed at meeting a hypothetical massive demand.  
Actually, the self-regulation initiatives focused on procedural mechanisms, such as the use of 
both formal (including credit bureaus) and informal sources of information in the screening 
process; adequate training and incentive schemes to the staff; and respectful and adequate 
recovery procedures (Schicks and Rosenberg, 2011; Smart Campaign, 2013). Hence, client 
                                                 
2 Six randomized control studies conducted between 2003 and 2012 highlight that no impact was found for poverty 
reduction variables, such as the total household income. These studies showed, however, that for an average borrower 
there were improvements in several indicators related to the business (revenues, profits, assets), and changes in the 
household income composition, with an increase of business income suggesting positive effects on consumption 
smoothing (Banerjee et al., 2015) 
3 The Smart Campaign was launched in 2009. It aims to raise awareness among practitioners for the need to focus on 
clients’ well-being as the driving force of the industry, and to respect the principle of (at least) doing no harm to the 
clients (IFC, 2013). 
4 Especially when these crises are characterized by strong emotions and collective actions of the participants (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008), like it happened in Andhra Pradesh and Nicaragua. 
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overindebtedness and market saturation have been seen as simple distortions of the credit industry 
that can be solved or fixed by the system itself.  
Relying on field grounded research in the Dominican Republic, we argue that the issue of 
overindebtedness implies a deeper analysis. Even when seriously designed, and with well-
intentioned purposes, self-regulation mechanisms may not be enough to protect microfinance 
consumers against overindebtedness, challenging the 'doing good by doing well' approach that 
lays down the commercialization paradigm of microfinance.  
We use the case of the Dominican Republic to illustrate the dynamics underlying competitive 
microfinance markets that influence the application of procedures by the MFIs (particularly by 
the loan officers), and in turn the outcomes of the self-regulation mechanisms implemented to 
prevent overindebtedness. The implementation of such consumer protection mechanisms, 
presented as allying with the social principle of microfinance "not to harm the poor", reduces the 
default risk (i.e. in line with a market-led banking approach), but seems to fail to safeguard the 
debtors. The explanatory factors include the specificities of the context: a large informal lending 
sector, together with limited market potential, conflicts with high growth objectives, and 
translates into strong competition on a specific population segment (urban working poor). 
We build our arguments on different sources with a combination of primary and secondary data, 
namely, field research conducted by the authors between 2012 and 20155; data on the country’s 
economic and social environment as well as its financial and microfinance markets published by 
the Dominican Republic Central Bank, REDOMIF and FondoMicro; and data on financial 
inclusion from the Global Findex Database. 
The paper starts with a theoretical conceptualization of the self-regulation mechanisms used to 
prevent overindebtedness, and the market dynamics in which they are designed and implemented. 
In the following section, we present the methodological approach and give an overview of the 
Dominican Republic microfinance market. Section 4 analyses the self-regulation mechanisms 
applied by the main MFIs with reference to the overindebtedness prevention best practices, 
identifying insufficiencies and loopholes resulting from market dynamics associated with high 
competition contexts. The last section presents the conclusions. 
2. Microfinance markets and overindebtedness prevention  
Access to formal financial services is seen as essential to poor people that have to cope with low 
and irregular incomes, often with no help from supporting social and financial structures (as they 
are non-existent or deficient in developing countries), making these populations vulnerable to all 
sort of shocks, including unemployment, health emergencies and natural disasters (Collins et al., 
2009).  
While early microcredit schemes were designed to finance the income-generating activities of the 
unbanked and the poor populations, an alternative vision of microfinance has gained ground since 
the 2000s. It makes the case for boosting the financial inclusion of poor people through 
appropriate financial services, covering shortfalls in all areas of life, including consumer 
                                                 
5 These research activities were conducted in the frame of the Microfinance in Crisis Project (www.microfinance-in-
crisis.org) funded by the European Investment Bank research program (EIBURS) 
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expenditure, housing expenses, and basic services related expenses (Collins et al., 2009; 
Intellecap, 2009). This paradigm shift that occurred after 2005 opened new market opportunities 
for microcredit suppliers, entailing strong growth and competition between a diversity of 
providers, especially in urban and peri-urban areas. Therefore, the microfinance landscape has 
become more and more diversified, and competitive. Actually, beyond microfinance institutions, 
public programs and commercial banks willing to downscale their activities to low-income 
populations have also been working with microfinance clients (Ledgerwood and Gibson, 2013). 
Competition among suppliers is theoretically seen as positive for the clients by lowering prices 
and encouraging the development of new products. This perspective is in line with the neoliberal 
economic consumerism approach, in which what matters is that consumers have easy access to 
different choices at the cheapest price (Wilson, 2013). 
However, in microcredit markets the outcomes are not always positive. By increasing information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, competition may be detrimental for the poorest 
clients as providers may tend to concentrate in the safer and less poor clients (McIntosh and 
Wydick, 2005). Intense competition among financial providers may also lead to collusion and 
oligopolistic practices that allow high interest rates, as observed in Ecuador, Mexico and the 
Philippines (Karnani, 2011); and it can reduce the selection standards, weaken the relationships 
with the clients (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010), and facilitate multiple borrowing and client 
default (Assefa et al., 2013).  
These are some of the elements identified in the delinquency crises that have occurred in some of 
the most important microfinance markets. Chen et al. (2010) mention market competition and 
multiple borrowing, MFIs’ outstretched systems and controls, and the erosion of the lending 
discipline as primary causes for the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nicaragua, Morocco and 
Pakistan. D’Espallier et al. (2015) explore the perils of MFIs’ focus on growth as the pressure put 
on the financial and operational skills of the organizations can lead to the erosion of important 
mechanisms in the traditional microcredit programs success, namely the decentralized decision 
process and the proximity between credit officers and clients. Finally, based on quantitative data 
from several countries, Krauss et al. (2012) mention market penetration as one of the roots of the 
overindebtedness crises. By contrast, Yigma (2015) using a dataset of 953 MFIs concludes that 
higher growth does not lead to increased default risk, inversely it improves portfolio quality.  
In the analysis of the crises, and in the response to them, the association between delinquency 
rates and clients’ overindebtedness assumed particular relevance and reinforced the attention 
given by practitioners to portfolio quality. The maintenance of a low PAR30 (Portfolio at Risk at 
30 days) is seen by many practitioners as sufficient to ensure that the clients are not overindebted, 
but there is no direct correlation between non-repayment of the loans and overindebtedness 
(Schicks, 2013; Gonzalez, 2008; Guérin et al., 2013).  
The quest for growth in order to achieve financial sustainability, and the strong belief in portfolio 
quality as guarantor of a healthy market, are translated into the operational targets and incentive 
schemes set by the MFIs managers for their loan officers. These are based on portfolio size, 
growth and quality criteria (McKim and Hughart, 2005), and make use of financial indicators as 
the PAR30, a noticeable sign of the banking logic influence in microfinance. Incentives and 
training help in aligning loan officers and management interests, minimizing agency costs, and 
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guaranteeing a focus on growth while keeping arrears under control. At the end, however, the 
institutional perspective, being the interest of the MFI (and its owners), prevails. 
In contrast with the principles proclaimed by the Smart Campaign, clients seem to come second. 
The examples of financial fragility found among borrowers, independently of its causes, seem to 
be undervalued by the MFIs as long as these clients keep repaying their microcredit loans 
(Schicks, 2014; Guérin et al., 2013; Morvant-Roux et al., 2015). It is therefore crucial that MFIs 
do not forget to monitor client satisfaction, and take up the task of raising client awareness of 
their rights and responsibilities (Ghate, 2007). 
In April 2014, the Microfinance CEO Working Group6 prioritized the following as self-regulation 
mechanisms to be adopted by lenders in order to mitigate the risk of overindebtedness: regular 
reporting to a universal credit bureau; 7  strengthening of screening processes to be able to 
effectively evaluate the candidate’s level of indebtedness; and monitoring carefully areas of high 
competition (Firth, 2014). 
Among these priorities, credit reporting has recently received much attention from microfinance 
practitioners and policymakers in a context of high growth, competition and increased risk of 
cross-borrowing. In order to be effective, all the lenders involved in a given market are meant to 
regularly report to the credit bureau (Chen et al. 2010). However, credit bureaus depict only a 
partial image of a country’s financial sector as they do not include the vast majority of informal 
financial providers, an important source of credit for example in the Dominican context. 
The over-indebtedness prevention mechanisms enlisted above can be seen as a form of self-
regulation. Gugerty (2008) describes self-regulation as collective action aiming to shape or 
constrain organizational behaviour through standards and rules of conduct set by an industry-level 
organization (as the Smart Campaign). Since these rules do not have the force of law, the 
implementation of this collective action presents critical challenges for the participants. Rozas 
(2014), when talking about the attempt by MFIN to establish a code of conduct for MFIs, 
describes some of these challenges for the microfinance sector. Gugerty (2008) based on the 
institutional theory suggests that effective self-regulation requires two conditions: clear standards 
for behaviour and credible enforcement mechanisms.  
In section 4, we will show that both conditions fail in the microfinance sector in a context of high 
competition and growth oriented institutions. Our study will point out that the Dominican 
Republic case illustrates that high-standard microfinance service provision within a regulated, 
expanding industry, with low portfolio at risk and widely used credit bureaus, does not necessarily 
bring about positive social outcomes for the clients.  
3. The Dominican Republic experience 
                                                 
6 The CEO Working Group integrates the leaders of ten international institutions promoting microfinance: Accion, 
BRAC, CARE, FINCA International, Freedom from Hunger, Grameen Foundation, Opportunity International, Pro 
Mujer, VisionFund International and Women’s World Banking, http://microfinanceceoworkinggroup.org/   (access on 
28/02/2015). 
7 Credit bureaus are institutions, public or private, which gather and give out information on the creditworthiness of 
individual borrowers as well as enterprises (Pearson, 2008). 
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3.1. Research methodology 
The research builds on qualitative fieldwork developed in the two largest cities, Santo Domingo 
and Santiago de los Caballeros, where most clients and institutions are concentrated, and 
competition is high. The six participating MFIs include the market leaders (Banco Ademi and 
Banco Adopem), a NGO that was under a transformation process to become a Bank (FONDESA), 
a cooperative (ASPIRE) and two NGOs (FDD and FIME).8   
Over the three years (2012-2015) of the Microfinance in Crisis research project, four field visits 
of one week to three months were carried out, allowing an in-depth contact with the main players 
in the market (clients, loan officers, MFIs’ managers, informal credit providers, local consultants 
and other actors), and a comprehensive analysis of the particular interactions between supply and 
demand.  
The heterogeneity of situations associated with microfinance markets, particularly when 
addressing questions as complex as client overindebtedness, upholds the option to use qualitative 
methodologies. These are best suited to disentangle and analyze cognitive and social processes 
that underlie the observed effects (i.e., how a given intervention triggers effects ultimately 
resulting in an observed outcome).  
Qualitative methodologies draw on a broad range of methods. This paper is based on semi-
structured interviews performed with a wide set of actors aiming at comparing and contrasting 
insights from different perspectives (triangulation), and uncovering the heterogeneity of the 
individual situations. We interviewed 45 MFI clients, 14 non-clients, 4 head managers, 10 branch 
managers, loan officers (visit of 16 branches, representing more than 100 loan officers and 50,000 
active clients), and other main actors in the field (including 4 informal lenders). Furthermore, the 
work also included the observation of 12 loan officers’ daily work; the participation at 5 staff 
training sessions; and the revision of MFIs’ internal documentation. The loan officers 
interviewed, and accompanied in their daily work, had different levels of experience and were 
working in various microcredit programs. 
Clients were chosen to ensure diversity of repayment performances, portfolio of activities and 
neighbourhoods. It is important to stress that we took into account the appreciation of the client 
by the loan officer in charge of the specific area where we were conducting the interviews. We 
asked them to identify the ‘good’ borrowers and the ‘bad’, meaning late. This allowed us to 
capture the gap between the information gathered by the loan officers and our own information 
after interviewing the clients.  Non-clients were selected randomly in the same neighbourhoods. 
The clients and non-clients interview guides included questions about family composition, main 
life cycle events, and evolution of employment status/portfolio of activities, including job 
migration. We also included questions about financial practices: savings, credit sources, 
outstanding debt level, and weekly repayments. We gave particular attention to ‘repayment 
hierarchies’: which credit providers come first in the repayment priorities, relationship with and 
perception of each specific credit provider, etc. Finally, in order to uncover punctual shocks and 
structural factors that may affect repayment behaviour and lead to potential sacrifices, an ex-post 
                                                 
8 FIME is a subsidiary of VisionFund International and has recently changed its name to VisionFund Republica 
Dominicana. 
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assessment of repayment strategies was performed, focusing on concrete examples and avoiding 
general answers. 
Following Van den Berg (2005), contextualizing data collection is an important aspect of the 
qualitative approach. Clients, as well as loan officers, may use a different discourse depending on 
the interview location. We, therefore, insisted on doing the interviews like ‘informal’ discussions, 
meeting the interviewees at home instead of the MFI branch office. Triangulation of information 
(as mentioned previously) was also a main concern along our data collection process. It was 
achieved through daily meetings among team members, which allowed comparing observations 
from different researchers, and by interviewing a large set of actors. 
3.2. The Microfinance sector 
The Dominican Republic is classified as a middle-income country, and is the largest economy in 
Central America and the Caribbean. However, infrastructures are still highly inadequate; poverty 
is higher (41%, 2013) than in 2000 (32%);9 and a significant part of the economically active 
population is self-employed (40% in April 2014).10  
As far as the financial supply is concerned, 12 MFIs reported to the Mix Market in 2013 while 
the national microfinance network, REDOMIF, had 22 members serving 387,192 clients (60.3% 
women), and a loan portfolio of 619,04 million US$.11 The largest MFIs, Banco Ademi and Banco 
Adopem are regulated financial institutions,12 and are supervised by the Dominican Republic 
Central Bank. In 2014, the definitive version of the Microcredit Regulation was approved.13 
Table 1 – Microfinance Sector in the Dominican Republic 
MFI Report 
Date 
Nr. Borrowers 
(Female) (1) 
Loans (USD) Nr. 
Depositors 
Deposits 
(USD) 
PAR30 
(1) 
Banco ADEMI Jun15 n.a. (50%) 270,227,542 230,391 241,196,213 1,5% 
Banco ADOPEM Jun15 207,218 
(70.7%) 
100,855,481 330,863 52,808,838 3.5% 
ALNAP 2014 29,799 
(38.6%) 
328,955,819 n.a. 419,933,432 2.5% 
BANFONDESA 2014 69,337  54,911,992 - - n.a. 
COOP-ASPIRE 2014 24,033(70.4%) 13,781,351 32,395 9,445,528 4.2% 
ECLOF DOM 2014 17,524 
(81,5%) 
6,365,482 - - 2.3% 
FDD 2014 15,712 
(57.2%) 
5,087,359 - - 0.1% 
F. Esperanza 2014 10,023 (92%) 3,469,691 - - 3.4% 
                                                 
9 World DataBank – World Development Indicators: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) 
available at  http://databank.worldbank.org/   
10 http://www.bancentral.gov.do/estadisticas_economicas/mercado_trabajo/ (access 04/12/2014).  
11 http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Dominican%20Republic; http://www.redomif.org.do/ (access 07/09/2015) 
12 They both started as NGOs and turned into banks in 1997 and 2004, respectively. Other institutions are following 
this transformation pattern is: ASPIRE became a cooperative in 2013 and FONDESA, the third biggest MFI, is in the 
process of becoming a credit and savings bank. 
13 Document available at:  
http://www.bancentral.gov.do/normativa/normas_vigentes/financieros/Segunda_Resoluci%C3%B3n_Junta_Monetari
a_14_agosto_2014_aprueba_versi%C3%B3n_definitiva_Reglamento_Microcr%C3%A9ditos.pdf  (access 20/06/15) 
 
9 
Vision Fund 
DOM 
2014 5,297 (60.4%) 2,279,968 - - 7.2% 
Credito Amigo 
(BHD) 
2013 5,912 (45.5%) 9,895,322 n.a. 1,951,669 4.1% 
CDD 2013 4,207 (70%) 1,644,649 n.a. 43,018 10.4% 
MUDE DOM 2013 4,420  896,896 - - n.a. 
Sources: Mix Market and REDOMIF 
Notes: n.a. – not available  (1) Data on 30/06/2014  
 
The microfinance landscape is, however, much larger and diversified. The government 
participates directly in the market through public credit programs (Promipyme and Banca 
Solidaria), and similarly commercial banks like BHD and ScotiaBank have set up separate 
microcredit units – Crédito Amigo and Scotia Soluciones, respectively. There are various other 
formal and semi-formal financial providers, including local cooperatives, and many small to 
medium sized companies. They usually offer credit at a higher interest rate than MFIs,14 and have 
shorter terms and frequent instalments.  
Beyond semi-formal and formal credit providers, various recent studies have shown the relevance 
of informal financial landscapes to understand how people perceive and use different formal 
financial services such as microcredit (Morvant, 2006; Collins et al., 2009; Guérin et al., 2011a). 
The informal sector is highly developed in the Dominican Republic. 15 Loans issued through 
social networks (family and friends), on one side, and private lenders, on the other, represented 
the two main sources of credit, for the bottom 40% of the population in 2014, according to the 
Global Financial Inclusion Index.16 Lending money is perceived as a lucrative activity and some 
microcredit officers start their own moneylending businesses (after leaving their MFIs), while 
some microcredit borrowers are themselves moneylenders. The informal sector also includes 
pawnbrokers, ROSCAs, and credit purchases for durable goods. 
MFIs are, therefore, part of a highly dynamic and interrelated financial landscape, in which formal 
and informal sharing information mechanisms are an important feature. There are two private 
credit bureaus, Datacred and Transunion, which are widely used, including by some informal 
lenders who usually report to one of the bureaus. 
For the largest MFIs at least, lending policies and procedures adhere to international ‘best 
practices’. This includes sophisticated techniques for assessing client indebtedness, repayment 
capacities and willingness to repay (Afonso, 2013). This cautious sector management has kept 
portfolio at risk under control (PAR30 was 5% in 2013).17 
Using Mix Market data for 2008, Gonzalez (2010) found a penetration rate of microfinance in the 
total population of the Dominican Republic of below 4% which compared to 25% in Bangladesh, 
                                                 
14 Contact with clients and some moneylenders indicated a common interest rate of 20%/month for informal loans, 
though we did find lower rates (one private moneylender interviewed applied an average of 8%/month), while one of 
the largest microcredit banks charged between 3 and 4.6%/month for the different business loans. 
15 The estimated number of moneylenders in the country appears to be between 8000 and 11500 (Gonzalez and Servet, 
2014) 
16 http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/country/dominican-republic (access 24/05/2015) 
17  http://www.redcamif.org/index.php/es/calidad-de-cartera.html (access 19/05/2016). The data from REDCAMIF 
shows that PAR30 has been deteriorating since December 2013, growing from 5% to 7.4% at the end of 2015. 
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and to higher rates in other Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua (11%), Peru (10%) and 
Bolivia (9%).18  
Nonetheless, this picture seems to be changing. In the MIMOSA (Microfinance Index on Market 
Outreach and Saturation) report based on 2014 data, the Dominican Republic market is classified 
as a normal, approaching saturation market (score 3), which compares with a score 2, normal in 
2011 (Javoy and Rozas, 2015). Likewise, the Global Findex data for 2014 shows an impressive 
increase in the number of adults with formal bank accounts (from 38% in 2011 to 54%), and an 
also relevant growth of the percentage of adults that had obtained credit from formal financial 
providers (13.9% in 2011 to 18.2%); with more than half of the respondents having borrowed 
some money in the previous year (both from formal and informal sources).19  
Thus, while the country’s microfinance market is still maturing with close to 1,4 million potential 
clients without or with limited access to formal financial services (most of them located in rural 
and marginalized areas), 20  in some sections of the largest cities, competition is fierce (as 
recognized by some of the MFIs managers). These are densely populated areas where most people 
are considered to be poor and self-employment is high. One top manager explained that 
competition was especially strong for a particular segment of the population: entrepreneurs with 
small but organized businesses requesting loans of around US$1,000 (the ‘good and safe’ clients). 
In our field work, developed in these competitive areas, we found that a part of the clients 
interviewed were in a financially vulnerable situation (Figure 1). We used various indicators 
(debt/income ratio, short and long term sacrifices to repay, no perspective of exit debt) to assess 
the indebtedness level of the 45 MFI clients we interviewed.  
Figure 1 – MFI Clients Indebtedness Level 
 
                                                 
18 Gonzalez (2010) concludes that rates over 10% were likely to deteriorate the portfolio quality of the MFIs. 
19 http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/country/dominican-republic (access 04/04/16). Adults include all 
population with 15 or more years and credit from formal institutions refers to borrowings from a bank, credit union, 
microfinance institution, or another financial institution such as a cooperative. 
20  http://www.fomin.org/en-us/Home/News/PressReleases/ArtMID/3819/ArticleID/49/The-MIF-works-to-improve-
access-to-microfinance-services-in-rural-areas-of-the-Dominican-Republic.aspx (access 23/09/15) 
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Source: Own construction 
Notes: 
The data on “sacrifices long-term”, “sacrifices short-term” and “no perspective of exit debt” correspond to 
the subjective perception of the interviewed clients on the sacrifices made to be able to keep repaying their 
loans. Thus, sacrifices long-term reflect what the clients are compromising in the future (for instance, 
investments in housing or education); sacrifices short-term relate to cuts on daily consumption (food, 
communications, etc.); and the perspective of exit from debt refers to the ability to totally repay the active 
loans in the short-term. 
The ratio debt/income data was also collected during the interviews. It corresponds to the part of the 
household monthly income that needs to be allocated to debt (installments) repayment. 
 
For eight households, the debt/income ratio was higher than 67%. These more indebted 
households included, very interestingly, four clients that were introduced by the respective loan 
officers as ‘regular’ or ‘good’ clients who always or often repaid on time. In the interviews, they 
openly talked about how they struggled to repay their loans. One told us that he was always 
struggling, and that he had no way out of the debt (“siempre vivo con apuro y no hay forma de 
pararlo”). A mother told us she was giving water and sugar to her baby instead of milk whenever 
she was running late with repayments. Nonetheless, as most of them stressed, it is better to make 
sacrifices, such as only eating rice and bananas, than to lose the asset of being a good payer. These 
results are in line with the findings of Schicks (2014) in Ghana, albeit a different context, and 
seem to indicate a prevalence of market dynamics over client protection measures. 
4. Best practices and self-regulation in “practice” 
The success of initial microcredit programs has been associated with the innovation of group 
lending methodology but, for several reasons, the evolution of the sector has been accompanied 
by a preference for individual loans (Ledgwerwood and Gibson, 2013). This is a trend also 
verified in the Dominican Republic.21 The loans are usually individual, which boosts the impact 
                                                 
21 REDOMIF reports only 12.1% of the loan portfolio of their members corresponded to group loans in 30/06/2014. 
http://redomif.org.do/data/uploads/revista_microfinanzas_de_centroamerica_y_del_caribe__edicion_21__junio_2014
_web.pdf (access 08/09/2015) 
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of the institutional screening procedures, and more concretely the credit officers’ practices, in the 
success of the loans and in the management of overindebtedness risks.  
A proper selection of clients means having in place an evaluation process that combines formal 
and informal information sources, including the credit bureau (Afonso, 2013). However, the level 
of informality prevailing both at the labor and financial markets in the Dominican Republic (Ortiz 
et al., 2014) introduces operational constraints that weaken the selection process. Loan officers 
have to depend on informal sources to complement the data obtained from the credit bureau but, 
needless to say, collecting data from informal sources is a difficult task: it is not easy to meet the 
people, information is not error free, and the process is time consuming. Finally, it implies 
building close relationships with clients, and may bring additional risks as highlighted in other 
contexts as shown by Morvant-Roux & Roesch (2015) in urban and peri-urban settings of 
Morocco.  
4.1. Pressure on loan officers 
In the field experience what was observed was that loan officers (in general) have very tight 
schedules with a diversity of tasks that prevent a more thorough evaluation of the clients. The 
time dedicated, and the level of priority given by the loan officers to each task, is highly dependent 
on the incentive schemes defined by the MFIs’ management, and on the daily directives provided 
by the branch managers. Under the pressure of growth and competition, the accomplishment of 
monthly and quarterly goals becomes a much more present concern at branch level than the rigour 
of the screening process, and this was common to all MFIs.  
At one of the MFIs, interviews with loan officers and observation at the branch level revealed 
that the goals set by top managers were in general considered ambitious; the rewards for attaining 
them had an important weight in the loan officers’ income and their career prospects; and, 
likewise, the regular non-achievement of the targets was associated with dismissal. The monthly 
goals were defined in terms of number and amount of loans, and arrears. In the first six months 
of 2013, goal achievement by the institution’s loan officers was irregular but the negative 
incentive (dismissal) was not confirmed. Nevertheless, as shown by Afonso (2013) the pressure 
on most loan officers was evident, even if there was flexibility when assessing the performance22. 
This pressure also translates into the effort to renew loans of existing clients or to attract new 
clients, creating the conditions for weakened evaluation procedures. In such a competitive market, 
with very strong information asymmetries, it is easier to grow through existing clients. We found 
that many MFIs have a policy to refinance clients when they reach around three quarters of the 
loan and have been repaying regularly, creating a permanent debt-relationship.23 Some of the 
interviewed loan officers told us that they try to stimulate demand by “creating the necessities”; 
if they see that a ‘good’ client is not considering applying for a new loan. Using the information 
                                                 
22 Data on goals compliance in the previous 6 months (for the 288 loan officers with portfolio assigned for at least 6 
months at 30/06/2013) showed that half of the loan officers did not manage to reach the arrears goal in at least 3 months 
(65% for the target number of loans, and 41% for the loans amount goal). The data was obtained from the information 
system of one of the largest MFIs (Afonso, 2013). 
23 It is common policy for MFIs to renew loans, but some of them try to restrict this practice not allowing  there 
structuring or consolidation of defaulting loans. 
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collected in the home visit to the client, they suggest possible ways to invest the new credit, such 
as buying a computer for the children, renovating a room in the house or investing in the business.  
The effort to achieve the arrears goals was reflected in the time spent on recovery tasks, and in 
the amount of pressure put on the clients to repay, both in terms of the number of contacts close 
to the repayment date and the arguments used to ‘convince’ the client. Some loan officers try to 
use clients’ compassion towards the potential loan officer dismissal if he/she does not meet the 
targets. One of the loan officers suggested to a client to take up a loan from a moneylender in 
order to repay the microcredit instalment before the end of the month (i.e. before arrears affected 
PAR30).  
From a different perspective, the focus on arrears as the alert signal for overindebtedness leads to 
less rigour put into the evaluation process of renewal loans, as long as the client is repaying on 
time (as reported by several branch managers and loan officers from different MFIs). 
Thus, our field observations, both at client and credit officers’ levels, indicate that the 
combination of growth and portfolio quality imperatives, in a context of high competition, can 
push credit officers to indulge in practices that are not in the clients’ best interest. 
4.2. Lender uses and Borrower perceptions of the Credit Bureau 
Credit bureaus are seen as one of the most effective means to protect clients, and they are widely 
used in the Dominican Republic. The data available allows for the evaluation of the client’s 
indebtedness level, and the identification of cross-borrowing practices. This is particularly 
relevant since the relation between multiple borrowing and overindebtedness has been confirmed 
in several empirical studies conducted in Bolivia (Vogelgesang, 2003), the Philippines (Diaz and 
Ledesma, 2011) and Cambodia (Dannet, 2013). 
The maximum number of active loans that a candidate may have registered at the credit bureau, 
in order to be eligible for a microcredit loan, is an interesting proxy for the offer and competition 
of the microfinance market. The six MFIs had various policies in this respect. Some have fixed 
the maximum at three loans, while for others the number is flexible and depends on case-by-case 
evaluations. However, whatever the criteria used, this analysis is insufficient in the context of the 
Dominican financial landscape. The relevance of informal financial sources (illustrated in the 
latest results of the Global Findex), and the fact that only a very small part of these lenders reports 
to one of the credit bureaus (González and Servet, 2014), makes it easy to find clients with five 
or more active loans, as indeed happened with some of the clients interviewed (8 cases in our 
sample). 
Moreover, the credit bureau information is not immediately updated (it can take up to a month). 
If a client applies for loans from more than one MFI simultaneously, this situation will not be 
visible in the bureau consultation made during the evaluation process, and the client might then 
obtain more than one loan at the same time. Such cases are easy to detect as we found in our 
sample. For instance, one of the clients interviewed had successfully applied for credit 
simultaneously from three MFIs for 75,000, 75,000 and 50,000 DOP, obtaining a total of 200,000 
DOP. 
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The issues related to the credit bureau do not only relate to insufficient coverage. In some MFI 
branches, credit bureaus are used, not only to assess the level of debt of their potential clients, but 
also as a source of information for ‘stealing’ clients. Clients of other MFIs are offered additional 
funding if they take up a loan with the MFI that repays the previous loan(s) with other 
institution(s). This is claimed to be a competitive strategy, whereby loan officers try to recruit 
new clients. It carries, however, some dangers by increasing the indebtedness level of the clients. 
Besides the larger amount of the new loan, there is no guarantee that the client will repay the 
previous credit as it was the case of one of the clients interviewed. 
The access to MFI loans by people previously excluded from the formal financial markets allows 
them to start a credit history in the credit bureau, and ‘opens a door’ to future opportunities. 
However, this argument can be quite dangerous for some clients. If a borrower/potential client is 
known to have credit, and the information from the bureau is positive, this potential client will 
most likely be contacted by formal and informal lenders offering a wide variety of products, and 
sometimes making use of marketing techniques that may be considered as aggressive. This was 
the case of one of the clients interviewed in Santo Domingo. He did not have debt previously but 
once he got the first formal credit, a credit card from a Bank, he was repeatedly approached by 
other institutions and ended up with five different credit cards (all regularly used) and two loans, 
from a cooperative and a microfinance institution. He was, unsurprisingly, struggling to repay all 
these debts on time. 
The credit bureau has an even stronger role in repayment enforcement, acting as an effective 
deterrent of strategic default situations. The consequences associated with being blacklisted in the 
credit bureau go beyond access to new loans. It affects also the possibilities of having a bank 
account, making utilities contracts and even access formal jobs and visas to travel. Thus, building 
a good credit score at the credit bureau, to ensure present and future needs, is an ‘easy’ argument 
used by the loan officers when promoting the MFI’s credit products or when recovering loans. 
The field work has shown that loan officers do use it persistently.  
Equally, the power of the argument is reinforced by the perception the clients have on the credit 
bureau (“el diablo”, for some), and on their financial needs. There are psychological motives 
(overconfidence, time bias, lack of self-discipline), as well as social factors (social mobility 
aspirations, consumerism, social norms related to debt, peer pressure), that can lead poor people 
to increase their debt beyond their true capacity to repay as highlighted by various qualitative case 
studies from India, Mexico and Madagascar in Guérin et al. (2013) and in Ghana by Schicks 
(2013). The awareness by clients and non-clients of the existence of the credit bureau (and the 
negative consequences of defaulting) is among these factors, and induces practices of cross-debt 
and juggling strategies so as to maintain creditworthiness with formal financial institutions, even 
when repaying already implies some sort of sacrifice or extra effort as shown by Guérin et al. in 
rural south India (2011)  
5. Conclusions 
Several scholars have pointed out that the commercial microfinance industry has a fundamental 
problem with recurring crises of overindebtedness (D’Espallier et al., 2015). The Dominican 
Republic case study shows evidence that current weapon of choice, self-regulation, is ineffective. 
Actually, while microcredit markets may bring valuable social outcomes, competition, efficiency 
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and self-governance translate into unhealthy growth and market saturation in some areas, 
affecting clients’ well-being.  
Similarly to what has happened in other areas of development, the attention given to self-
regulation mechanisms in the microfinance sector has been a reaction to the delinquency crises in 
the sector, and the bad publicity associated with them (Loyd and De Las Casas, 2006). However, 
the two conditions for successful self-regulation identified by Gugerty (2008), clear standards and 
enforcement mechanisms, are not met in the Dominican Republic. The main MFIs adhere to 
international principles and ‘best practices’ concerning overindebtedness prevention that are 
broadly defined by the Smart Campaign but each institution defines and implements its own 
mechanisms as there is no set of policies and procedures defined collectively (for instance at the 
national microfinance network level), and there are no external enforcement mechanisms. 
Microfinance markets should, therefore, be carefully organized. 
The Dominican case draws attention to the need for the sector as a whole to reflect deeply on the 
principles orienting the commercialization movement, namely the focus on growth and financial 
sustainability, and its effects on competition. This reflection should also include an evaluation of 
the self-regulation mechanisms in place, introducing the necessary changes to make them 
effective. Considering the operational constraints and the pressure exerted on the loan officers, it 
will be crucial that among these changes MFIs re-evaluate their growth objectives and strategies, 
as well as the incentive schemes and signals conveyed to loan officers in the more saturated areas.  
Furthermore, highlighting the idea that clients’ overindebtedness may exist independently of their 
repayment performance, it will also be important to look beyond the portfolio quality indicators, 
and consider strategies to minimize borrowers’ risk factors. While financial literacy is often 
mentioned as the other magic bullet to prevent overindebtedness, we consider that changing the 
borrowers’ behaviour is not enough, and we argue that these measures should come with a new 
paradigmatic shift within the sector itself.  
In the Dominican Republic, there is a good opportunity for MFIs to change the present ‘picture’. 
The new regulation on financial agents opens possibilities for MFIs to extend their services to 
more remote and underserved areas, minimizing the obstacles associated with higher transaction 
costs in these areas, and alleviating the competitive pressure in the more saturated urban areas. 
Although this is a new process that will imply changes and adjustments by the institutions, it is a 
good example of how public intervention can influence MFI behaviour and complement self-
regulation mechanisms.  
Emphasizing the idea that microfinance programs are implemented in a complex context in which 
demand, supply and environmental factors interact, it will be important in future research to 
further explore the role of regulation and public intervention in microfinance, and its interaction 
with the self-regulation mechanisms implemented within the sector. 
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